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Weick: Sovereign Immunity

EROSION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
BY FEDERAL DECISIONAL LAW
PAUL C. WEICK*

A

XI of the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State ....

MENDMENT

The efforts of the courts to reconcile the purposes of the eleventh
amendment with the supremacy of federal law have produced controversial results. The shield of sovereign immunity afforded the states
by the eleventh amendment has been worn dangerously thin. No attempt
will be made to detail the amendment's history; this has already been
accomplished by others.' However, various eleventh amendment principles
have been established by judicial decisions.
The eleventh amendment is not to be interpreted literally, but according to the "fundamental rule of jurisprudence" that "a state may not
be sued without its consent."' While the amendment does not literally
bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought
in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another
state.' Also, the Court has held that the applicability of the eleventh amendment "is to be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties
but by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears
*Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Chief Judge, 1963-69.
Formerly, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio; President,
Ohio State and Akron Bar Associations. LL.B., University of Cincinnati College of Law.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of his law clerks, Lee I. Fisher and

Daniel G. Galant, in the research and preparation of this article.

I Details of the eleventh amendment's history can be found in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 660-63 (1974), Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-28 (1934) and Nowak, The
Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422-41

(1975) [hereinafter cited as Nowak].
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184
(1964); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
2
3

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977

[5831

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 8

AKRON . wPREW

rvol". 10:4

from the entire record."4 Thus, even though a state is not named a party
to the action, the suit"iay ii 6 netliieles be ba'rredby the eleventh
amendment,
when the state in reality is the party.5 In Ford Motor Co. v.
Department
of Treasury,' the Court said, "[W]hei' the action is in essence
one for
recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial
party
in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from
suit even
though individual officials are nominal defendants."' Additionally,
in Dugan
v. Rank ' the 6C.itxJoid
"
The gener rule is that a suit is ag'amist the sovereign if "the.jpigxpent
6iht would expend itself on .the
tresury, or d.imai,
or
interferev,ith'the public administration,"public
or if'the effect of the"judgment
would be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel
it
to' act:"9
This' CIhk of immunity mii which state officials can wrap themselves
1
to protect against damage suits brought by citizens under CivilRights,,Acts
h ti~ir ed' u-pdA the office held by the offi6ial andlismotive -hus, throug "
pgkeoih1ig the amount .f immunity to the officeheld, the Court hs
divided the defenses availhble to fit the finctions performed,lby
the officials.
Recent court decisions on the extent of immunity available to
an officeholder Have' led' to varied results from' the viewloiifit 6f s .....'
ffici..
In
general, officials operating' within' the ju-dicialr and" egisfativ'
rA&li"
ha b.. absolute immunity, while those in the execiitii'e braiih'tiav only'
qualified immunity.
o This article: will explore recent court decisi'bs discusin
the- is§ "
of soveteip n state immunity from suit in th* feefal courts vi& tle
"el i ht
amendment aid'the scope of immunity which state' offi is-hav1'e
-' 'da-ma
s1iunVWde'r Civil Rights Acts.
I. SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICERS AND AVAILABLE RELIEF

A.' Ex parte Young
One judicially created exception to the language of the elevn'tli
amendment is the Ex parte Young dbctrind:'
Ei pdi'k Young" -te .Court.
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921).
5 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974).
6323 U.S. 459 (1945).
7 Id. at" 464. 6f course the bar of
the elevenih amendment. does. not extend to- counties,
and municipal
4

corporations. Whether a political entity is an arm of the state
-.or. anotherpolitical subdivision "depends in part upon the' nature of the
entity'created by'state law.",
Thus, the. Court in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of'Educ.
572. (1977) held that a local school board under Ohio law, on v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568,
balance, was "more like a
county or city than it is like an arm of the State."
8 372 U.S. 609(963).'
9 Id.

at 620 (citations omitted).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
10 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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held that state officials could be enjoined by a federal court as individuals
from enforcing a state statute which violated the Federal Constitution.
Soon after the Minnesota state legislature passed acts establishing various
railroad shipping rates, the Northern Pacific Railway Co. filed suit in
federal court to enjoin enforcement of the state rates. Even though the
federal court had entered a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement
of these rates, the state attorney general, Edward Young, obtained a writ
of mandamus in state court, in violation of the federal court injunction,
directing the railroad to obey the state law. Young was adjudged in contempt of court. He thereafter applied to the Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus, arguing that he was immune from suit in federal court
because of the eleventh amendment.
The Court ruled that the injunction against Young was valid for at
least three reasons: (1) the Attorney General was sued as an individual;
(2) the court was merely restraining the state officer from acting unconstitutionally; and (3) the federal court was not interfering with the sovereign authority of the state because the state cannot violate the Constitution.
The Court said:
It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting,
by the use of the name of the state, to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state
attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is
in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.
The state has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. 1
The idea that the court was enjoining the individual rather than the
state was pure fiction, because the state could not act other than through
its officials." As Clyde E. Jacobs notes, "The Court has often closed its
eyes, quite deliberately, to the reality of whether a decree against an officer
would operate against the government, as, in fact, it did in Ex parte Young
and in later cases in which Young was followed."'" This fiction has also
created a dichotomy in the state action doctrine: enforcement of a state
act is state action under the fourteenth amendment, but is viewed as an
11 Id. at 159-60.
12

L.

See Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U.
REV. 435, 437, (1962).

13 C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 157 (1972)

CHI.

[hereinafter

cited as JACOBS].
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individual act under the eleventh amendment." The upshot of the Young
rule though, was the reiteration of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution
over the states; federal courts were opened to enforce this axiom. The
Young doctrine, however, might have completely nullified the eleventh
amendment by judicial decisions if the dangerous trend of overextension had
not been at least temporarily arrested by Edelman v. Jordan." Rather
than permitting suits to be brought against state officials regardless of the
relief sought, Edelman restricted the relief available.
B. Edelman v. Jordan and the Retroactive-ProspectiveRelief Distinction
Edelman was a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which
sought a federal court injunction requiring state officials to comply with
federal welfare regulations and to disburse benefits withheld as a result
of past noncompliance. The Court upheld the grant of prospective injunctive relief against state officers, but refused to extend the principle
of Ex parte Young to retroactive relief as well.
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court
to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state
officer, no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money
judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may
be labeled "equitable" in
The Court held that the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction, as
limited by the eleventh amendment, in ordering the restitution of benefits
wrongfully withheld. While retroactive relief seemed to the Court similar
to damages, the fiscal consequences of prospective relief were a "necessary
consequence of compliance in the future" with federal law and thus had
only "ancillary" fiscal effect, permissible under Ex parte Young.'
Although Edelman serves to protect the state from retroactive relief,
its protection is still too limited. The fiscal consequences on the state
treasury from prospective injunctive relief will often be more than just
ancillary." Indeed, the Edelman Court observed that "the difference between
the type of relief barred by the eleventh amendment and that permitted
See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); C. WRHT,
LAW
FEDERAL COURTs 208 (3rd ed. 1976).
15 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
16 Id. at 666.
7
1 Id. at 668.
14

OF

18 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 459-60 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), in
which
a distinction is drawn between funds from the state treasury and separate and independent
state pension funds.
19 Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

682
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
id. at 666 n. 11.

(1974)

(Douglas, J., dissenting), with
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under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day
20
and night.
The difficulty, however, of complying with a court's order may be
more directly related to the size of the award than to its nature. 2 1 For
instance, the court of appeals in Edelman noted the far larger expenditure
that was required by the prospective part of the court's order.2
A more illuminating example of the problems associated with prospective relief is found in Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County.2
In Griffin the Attorney General of Virginia argued that the suit, brought to
enjoin the school board, other agencies, and certain officers "from refusing
to maintain and operate an efficient system of public free schools," was
a proceeding against the state barred by the eleventh amendment. The
Court tersely responded, "It has been settled law since Ex parte Young
... that suits against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading
constitutional rights are not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment."25 As
noted by Clyde E. Jacobs:
The statement in Griffin simply bypassed substantial objections that
the relief sought by the petitioner would require a levy of taxes and
the expenditure of public money, that it would interfere with public
administration, and that it would simultaneously forbid the government
from doing certain things while, in effect, commanding it to do other
things. 5
20

Id. at 667. The Court continued:
The injunction issued in Ex parte Young was not totally without effect on the State's
revenues, since the state law which the Attorney General was enjoined from enforcing
provided substantial monetary penalties against railroads which did not conform to
its provisions ....
But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these cases were
the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective

in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of
the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury
than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such

an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often inevitable consequence
of the principle announced in Ex parte Young....

Id.at 667-68.
21

See Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875, 1881

n.36 (1975).
22 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
23 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
24 Id. at 224.
25

Id. at 228.

26 JACOBS, supra note 13, at 157-58. See also Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 272 n.8 (6th
Cir. 1973) (Weick, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds,418 U.S. 717 (1974).

The orders entered by the District Court have certainly been expended on the public
treasury, have interfered with public administration, have restrained the State from
acting, and have compelled it to act, which is the test for determining whether the action

is against the State, under Dugan v. Rank [372 U.S. 609 (1963)]. Such an action is clearly

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
proscribed
by the Eleventh 1977
Amendment.
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Despite the simplicity of the conclusion that prospective relief has only
ancillary fiscal consequences and is not barred by the eleventh amendment,
the Sixth Circuit has recently reaffirmed this principle in Bradley v. Milliken." In Bradley the state defendants relied upon Edelman v. Jordan in
contending that the district court could not compel the state to pay for
any part of the educational components of the proposed school desegregation
plan. The court, however, noted that the order was part of a prospective
plan to comply with a constitutional requirement to eradicate all vestiges
of de jure segregation. Under Ex parte Young such prospective relief
was not barred by the eleventh amendment, and the state was ordered
to bear 75 per cent of the cost of 150 school buses and 75 per cent of
the cost of an additional 100 school buses.28 The purchase of 250 buses
would require the expenditure of millions of dollars by the state, including
the daily costs of operation and the employment of bus drivers. This can
hardly be classified as "ancillary". It further means that state taxpayers
not living in the Detroit District are being taxed for the desegregation
of the Detroit school system. Normally, funds for the operation of public
schools are obtained principally by taxation of real property within the
school district. The adverse effect on the operation of the Detroit school
system is given no consideration.
Although it would seem better to weigh the disruption that the type
of relief is likely to have on the state's fiscal policy and public administration in light of the principles of the eleventh amendment, the law at present
only makes a rigid distinction between retroactive and prospective relief.
C. Implied Waiver of the Eleventh Amendment
Another exception to the absolute language of the eleventh amendment
is the doctrine of waiver. It has long been held that a state may waive
its eleventh amendment protection. 9 The concept of implied waiver was
explicitly recognized in Parden v. Terminal R.R. ° In Parden, employees
of a railroad owned and operated by the State of Alabama sought recovery
against the state under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for
injuries sustained on the job. The Court held that Congress intended to
subject states which operated railroads in interstate commerce to liability
under the FELA although it had not evidenced an express intent in the
540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 380 (1976).
28 See also Bradley v. Milliken, 519 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930
(1975).
29
See Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
30 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
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statute or legislative history 1 . The operation of a railroad by the state
was a proprietary rather than a governmental function. It is clear that
Alabama waived its eleventh amendment protection against FELA suits
by implication when it began operating a railroad in interstate commerce.
It was only fair that it be subjected to the same liability as is imposed
upon private carriers arising out of the operation of a railroad.
Parden was later modified by the Court in Employees v. Department of
Public Health and Welfare. 2 An action was brought against the state by
employees of various state hospitals and schools for overtime compensation
due to them under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They based
their suit on the 1966 Amendments to the FLSA which created a federal
cause of action, but the Court held that there was no congressional intent
in the statute which provided for the state employees to sue the state. Such
a course of action was left to the Secretary of Labor. 3
Employees suggests that a state does not waive the amendment's
protection unless there is a specific grant of jurisdiction by Congress to
federal courts in federal legislation which covers the states. Employees also
posed the governmental-proprietary distinction of the state activity. In
Employees the state hospitals and training schools were public governmental
institutions and the state had no real option to discontinue their operation;
Parden on the other hand, involved a proprietary, profit-making activity the state-owned railroad. Employees implies that as the regulated state
enterprise approaches a purely governmental activity, a court should require
clearer proof of an express waiver. Juxtaposed alongside the governmentalproprietary distinction, Employees can be interpreted to require Congress
to give actual notice to the states within a sufficient time frame so as to
offer each state the opportunity to elect between participating in the federal
program, and thus waiving their immunity, and retaining the eleventh amendment protection by staying out of the program.
The third major case to deal with the doctrine of implied waiver was
Edelman v. Jordan.4 Before deciding whether the retroactive award was
barred by the eleventh amendment, the Edelman Court had to decide whether
the state had waived the amendment's protection. The Court found that
there was no implied waiver "because the necessary predicate for that doctrine was congressional intent to abrogate the immunity conferred by the
eleventh amendment."35 Edelman required that the federal legislation which
377 U.S. at 196-98.
U.S. 279 (1973).
3 Id. at 285-86.
34 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
35 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1976)
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
31
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was relied upon by the plaintiffs contain an express authorization to sue
a class of defendants including states. Mere participation by the state
in the welfare program was not sufficient to establish a waiver. 6 The Court
also rejected the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a substitute for an express
authorization to sue. The Court said:
But it has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended
to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely
because an action could be brought under that section against state
officers, rather than against the State itself."7
While Edelman properly limits the use of implied waiver, the perimeters
of Edelman have been further defined by the recent case of Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer 8 In Fitzpatrick plaintiffs sued for prospective and retroactive relief
for losses of retirement benefits caused by the state's discrimination, and
for attorney fees. They sued under the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 which authorized federal courts to award
money damages to private individuals against a state government that has
been found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination.
The Court upheld not only the prospective injunctive relief, but also upheld
the backpay award. Although it was in the form of retroactive relief
barred by Edelman, such relief is permissible when specifically authorized
by Congress pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The Fitzpatrick Court distinguished Edelman by noting that the "threshold fact of
congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer was
absent in Edelman."° Thus, Fitzpatrick held that the eleventh amendment
is "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment."'" This result is not surprising because Parden,
through the Commerce Clause, also effectively limits the eleventh amendment. Fitzpatrick, however, illuminates the proper focus of the eleventh
amendment. Since Congress in its constitutional powers can waive the
states' sovereign immunity from individual citizen suits in federal court,
the purpose of the eleventh amendment is to prevent federal courts from
42
infringing upon the sovereignty of the states.
D. Attorneys' Fees
The American rule does not permit the awarding of attorneys' fees
36 415 U.S. at 673.
37 Id. at 675-77. See also Martin v. University of Louisville, 541 F.2d 1171 (6th Cir. 1976);
Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1975).
38 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 (Supp. V, 1975).
40 427 U.S. at 452.
4'

id. at 456.

42 See generally Nowak, supra note 1.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
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to the winning party, unless the legislature or the contracting parties provide
for such compensation."3 Two exceptions to this rule, however, have been
established by the courts in the exercise of their equitable powers. First, if
the losing party has acted in bad faith, the successful litigant may recover
attorneys' fees. The award in such a situation is punitive." Bad faith "may
be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation." 5 The second exception" "has been to award expenses
where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a
class, that benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself." '
This prevents unjust enrichment of the class at the expense of the litigating
plaintiff. In this way the court's award "will operate to spread the costs
proportionately among them.""8 Generally, the benefit conferred must be
substantial, and the class ascertainable." Nevertheless, the courts cannot
award attorneys' fees on the "private attorney general" approach without
prior legislative authority.50
Recently, debate within the federal courts has raged over the award
of attorneys' fees and the limits placed on them by the eleventh amendment.
The Supreme Court has never fully addressed the question whether the
eleventh amendment bars the award of attorneys' fees against an unconsenting state or against state officials acting in their official capacities.51
In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,52 the Court reserved this
issue. Again, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,53 the Court declined to answer this
question because Congress, through its fourteenth amendment powers, pro43 See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975);

Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite. 396 U.S. 375, 392 n. 16 (1970);

Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1976).
44 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).

45Id. at 15.
46 Of course courts can assess attorneys' fees on a party for "willful disobedience of a court
order." Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923). See also

Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 712 (1967).
47 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
48 Id. at 394.

49Id. at 393-94. See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973). For cases which discuss
attorneys' fees awards against state officials acting in their personal capacity, see Class v.
Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1974); Skehon v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31,
43-44 & n. 7 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975).
50 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See also Special
Project, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REv. 685, 719-33 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as Special Project].
51 Special Project, supra note 50, at 733-42.
52 421 U.S. 240, 269-70 n. 44 (1975).
53

427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976).
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courts are divided on this issue.55
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However, the lower

The Sixth Circuit held that the eleventh amendment in this situation
bars the award of attorneys' fees. In Jordan v. Gilligan,5 " the court, after
careful analysis of precedent, relied on Edelman to hold that recovery of
attorneys' fees from the unconsenting state or public officials acting in their
official capacities would be from the public trough. The eleventh amendment
bars an award of attorneys' fees because it is "measured in terms of a
monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part
of the defendant state officials."5 7
An example of cases holding to the contrary are Souza v. Travisono8
and Bond v. Stanton." In Souza the First Circuit characterized attorneys'
fees as "part of the litigation expense." 6 The Court, relying upon Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,6 1 concluded that once a state and its officials
are amenable to suit in federal court, a state loses "some of its sovereign
character." 2
However, reliance on Fairmont Creamery to impose attorneys' fees is
misplaced. That case dealt with whether the State of Minnesota, as a
losing party before the Supreme Court, had to pay the cost of reproducing
the record. Court rules, Congressional statutory authority, and the long
practice of the Court, mandated an affirmative answer. Clearly, the payment
of attorneys' fees with statutory authority, as opposed to without such
authority, is distinguishable between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments.'3
In Bond v. Stanton, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was compelled
by the Supreme Court's summary affirmance without opinion in Sims
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). See also Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.

1976).
55 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269-70 n. 44 (1975);

Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1244 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976).
56 500 F.2d 701, 709-10 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
5 Id. at 710, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974). See also Huecker v.
Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1244 (6th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 901 (6th
Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 982 (1975). Both cases reaffirmed the
Sixth Circuit's decision of Jordan v. Gilligan.
58 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1976).
59 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated in light of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards

Act, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1976).
60 512 F.2d at 1140.
61275 U.S. 70 (1928).
62 512 F.2d at 1140, quoting Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 77 (1928).
6.3See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
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v. Amos " to award attorneys' fees against state officials sued in their
official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The eleventh amendment bar
did not stop a three judge panel in Sims from awarding attorneys' fees
in a reapportionment case against various Alabama state officials. Further,
the Bond Court noted that it was controlled by the statement in Hicks v.
Miranda" that "the lower courts are bound by summary decisions by this
Court 'until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not.' "6
The full precedential effect of Sims, however, must be placed in perspective. The Supreme Court has twice said that it did not address this
question, even citing Sims one time before making this statement.67 The
Sixth Circuit in Jordan v. Gilligan rejected the Sims precedent, pointing
out that the question was still open.68
Attorneys' fees awards, like damages, are a form of compensation to
private litigants paid with state funds if assessed against the state. These
awards raise the same problems of unfairness and inhibition of official
decision-making as do awards of damages. These are hardly permissible
"ancillary effects" on the state treasury within the meaning of Edelman v.
Jordan. Indeed, the amount of attorneys' fees asked for in recent civil
rights cases often amount to large sums of money. For example, in the
recent Kalamazoo, Michigan busing case, a United States District Court
approved attorneys' fees amounting to $350,000.69
The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Jordan v. Gilligan, barring the award
of attorneys' fees against the state, squares with the analytical framework
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D.Ala. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
422 U.S. 332 (1975).
66 Id.
at 344-45, quoting Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom., Doe v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973).
67 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 n. 44 (1975).
68 500 F.2d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1974). A student note has also pointed out that Sims is weak
precedent:
"The court [in Sims] limited its discussion of the eleventh amendment issue to the following
footnote:
Individuals who, as officers of a state, are clothed with some duty with regard to a
law of the state which contravenes the Constitution of the United States, may be restrained by injunction, and in such a case the state has no power to impart to its officers
any immunity from such injunction or from its consequences, including the court costs
incident thereto.
This emphasis upon the state's inability to immunize its officials who have been sued under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young indicates a failure to confront the underlying reality recognized in
Edelman: that, although the award nominally ran against the named defendants, it would
almost certainly be paid by the state. Because Sims offered no further support for its holding
on the eleventh amendment issue, it is apparent that it does not survive Edelman."
Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees Against a State Official Sued in His Official Capacity After
Edelman v. Jordan, 55 B.U.L. REv. 228, 236 (1975).
69 The Sunday Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Nov. 7, 1976 § 1, at 11,
col. 6. See Oliver v.
Kalamazoo
Bd. of Educ., 73 F.R.D.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977 30 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
64
65
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of Edelman. Edelman established a scale of barring retroactive relief of
damages at one end, and permitting prospective injunctive relief at the
other end. Attorneys' fees awards are encompassed within retroactive relief
because they are measured against a past legal action.
A recent development in the area of attorneys' fees is the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.0 It provides, in part, that for a civil
suit arising under certain civil rights laws, "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorneys' fee as part of the costs."
The law was passed to plug the gap created by the Alyeska Pipeline
case, and "to harmonize the incongruity of allowing attorney fees in Title
VII employment discrimination cases, but disallowing fees in such cases
brought under § 1981."72 Generally courts will not award attorneys' fees in
cases brought in bad faith, or which are frivolous. Rather the cost award may
be made to a party who has prevailed on an important matter in the lawsuit
or otherwise vindicates the rights of the litigants. The fees awarded must
be reasonable and not such as to be a windfall for the attorney. 7
71

The Fitzpatrick case provided Congress with the necessary authority
to pass this bill. Because section five of the fourteenth amendment can be
utilized to circumvent the eleventh amendment, state officials can now be
sued in their official capacities for attorneys' fees in civil rights cases.74 The
same criticism previously advanced concerning the raids on the state treasuries are equally applicable to this new law. The balancing between unrestrained state actions and officials hesitant to act for fear of liability becomes
Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988). This law states:
70

SEC. 2. That the Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. 1988) is amended by adding
the following: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977,
1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX or Public Law 92-318, or
in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to
enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part

of the costs.".
71 The following discussion is based generally on an analysis of this act in ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs & FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, 8 THmD BRANCH, BULL. OF THE
FED. CoURTS, No. 11 (1976).

Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 424 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (N.D. Miss.
1976).
73 See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.D.R. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Kerr v. Screen
72

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Perkins v.

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d
177, 186-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing the twelve relevant criteria to consider in awarding attorneys'
fees).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/8
12

Weick: Sovereign Immunity

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Spring, 1977]

too one-sided if every state action is later subject to second guessing in the
courtroom. This law adds to the imbalance.

II.

EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY UNDER

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The courts have uniformly held that states are not "persons" under
the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 and therefore are not subject to damage
6
suits based on this statute. Monroe v. Pape" held that municipal corporations
are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. Thus, the Supreme
Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer77 cited Monroe and then noted "[t]hat being
the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defend9
ant."78 The history of the statute supports this view." Also, as noted in
Edelman v. Jordan, section 1983 did not abrogate a state's eleventh amendment protection merely because an action could be brought under section
1983 against state officers.80
Since the eleventh amendment is a bar to recovering money damages
from officers when the award must come from the state treasury, plaintiffs
have sought damages by suing the official under section 1983. Section 1983
81
is silent in regard to immunity against its provisions. However, since 1951
it has been assumed that legislators and judges enjoy an absolute immunity
82
from suit under section 1983. Tenney v. Brandhove has been interpreted
to exclude legislators from the reach of section 1983, noting that the English
immunity for statements made in Parliament had been carried over to the
United States and codified in the speech and debate clause of the Constitution." Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said:
(Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 applied to section 1981 suit brought prior to act be74 See Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 424 F. Supp. 1242 (1976)

coming law).
75 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
76 365

U.S. 167 (1961).

77 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
78

Id. at 452.

79 Nowak, supra note 1, at 1464-68.
80 415 U.S. at 675-77.

81 The question is one of statutory construction. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316
(1975); Tenney v. Brandhove,341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
82 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
debate
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. As to the scope of legislative immunity and the speech and
clause, see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v.

McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v.United States 408 U.S. 606 (1972), United States

408 U.S. 501 (1972),
v. Brewster,
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The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the
public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected
to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this
Court in Fletcher v. Peck, that it was not consonant with our scheme
of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators,
has remained unquestioned."
In Pierson v. Ray85 the Court noted that it could find no evidence that
Congress intended to "abolish wholesale all common-law immunities" with
the passage of the civil rights laws.8" The Court held that judges were immune from liability under section 1983. The Court rationalized that
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are
brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most
intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal,
but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound
him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a
burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless
decision-making but to intimidation."
The immunity defense was severely restricted, however, for state executive officers when suits are brought under section 1983. In Scheuer v. Rhodes88
the personal representatives of the estates of three students who died during
the civil disorder on the Kent State University campus in May, 1970 brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought damages against the
Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General and certain officers of the Ohio
National Guard, all of the members of the Guard, and the President of
Kent State University.
The Court conceded that Edelman v. Jordan and other Supreme Court
cases had established that Ex parte Young was of no avail to a plaintiff
84

341 U.S. at 377.

85 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
86 Id. at 554.
87 Id.
See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416
U.S. 232, 243-44 (1974).
88 416 U.S. 232 (1974). One of the plaintiffs in this case sued the State
of Ohio in the state
court. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state had immunity and was not subject
to
suit in tort without its consent and that this did not violate the equal protection clause
of the
fourteenth amendment. Krause, Adm'r v. Ohio, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736
(1972),
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), rehearing
denied, 410 U.S. 918 (1973).
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9
who sought to obtain damages from the public treasury. The Court,
however, noted that where damages are sought against the officers person9
ally, such a remedy may be permissible. " Because the Court did not see
the suit as one in fact against the state, the key issue became whether the
state officers were immune from liability under section 1983.

The Court appeared to recognize that government officials cannot
function in an atmosphere that renders them liable for performing their
official duties. The Court stated:
[O]ne policy consideration seems to pervade the analysis: the public
interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection
of the public. Mr. Justice Jackson expressed this general proposition
succinctly, stating "it is not a tort for government to govern."91
The Court rejected an argument for absolute immunity. It noted that
such an "extreme" position would make any executive act an executive
fiat, the supreme law of the land.
Under our system of government, such a conclusion is obviously
untenable. There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount
authority of the Federal Constitution.9"
Thus, executive actions may be scrutinized by the courts. The Court held
that in a 1983 suit:
[A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch
of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as
they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability
is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for
the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct.9
It can be contended, however, that the official immunity questions should
never have been reached because it was in reality a suit against the state.
The Sixth Circuit in Krause v. Rhodes" noted that although the suit was
89 416 U.S. at 238.
90Id.
91 Id. at 241, citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953)

(Jackson, J., dissenting).

92 Id. at 248-49, quoting Chief Justice Hughes in Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98
(1932).
93 Id. at 247-48. See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959) (Harlan, J., speaking
for the plurality); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (Holmes, J.). Both cases
are discussed in Scheuer.
F.2d
430 (6th Cir. 1972),
94471 by
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"nominally" against the state officials, "in substance and effect [it was]
against the State of Ohio since [it] directly and vitally affected the rights
and interests of the State in the performance of its highest function, namely,
the suppression of riots or insurrection and the protection of the public."9
The suit, it was contended, seriously interfered with the public administration
of the state government, and thus the state was in fact the real party in
interest.
Although members of the executive branch do not have absolute immunity from section 1983 suits, the availability of the good faith/reasonable
belief defenses announced in Scheuer at least affords the executive state
official some protection. But it does not relieve the state of the necessity
to expend large sums of public funds to defend the Governor in proving
in court to a jury that he acted properly in calling out the National Guard
to suppress an insurrection or rebellion and to defend, in criminal and
civil cases, the members of the National Guard who responded to the call
to duty.
The recent case of Wood v. Strickland" indicates that the qualified
immunity announced in Scheuer is applicable even to those who engage
in limited public duties, as long as they have discretionary responsibilities.
The Court held that school officials were not liable for the imposition of
disciplinary penalties so long as they could not reasonably have known
that their action violated students' clearly established constitutional rights,
or provided they did not act with malicious intention to cause constitutional
or other injury. 7 In extending the qualified immunity from suits under
section 1983 to school board members, the Court relied on Scheuer, Pierson,
Tenney, and "strong public-policy reasons.""8 The Court stressed the need
for board members to make discretionary judgments in much the same way
that state officials must exercise their decision-making powers.
The problem with the immunity standard enunciated in Wood, however,
was pointed out by Justice Powell in his dissent.99 The Scheuer good faith/
reasonable belief test was watered down to require school officials to act
95 Id. at 433.
96 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
97 Id. at 322. For an application of Wood to the board of trustees of a university, see
Martin v. University of Louisville, 541 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Wolfel v.
Sanborn, Nos. 76-1030-31 (6th Cir. May 2, 1977); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975). Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 419 (1976), which characterizes the Wood standard in the conjunctive, with
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975), which quoted the Wood standard in the
disjunctive.
98 420 U.S. at 316-18.
99 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's

opinion.
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so as not to abridge a student's "unquestioned constitutional rights." The
wisdom of this approach is suspect when one considers that many constitutional scholars' predictions on the outcome of future Supreme Court decisions have been wide of the mark.
One need only to look to the decisions of this Court-to our reversals,
our recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splitsto recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are
"unquestioned constitutional rights."'0 0
Surely lay elected school board members can hardly be held liable for failure
to divine what even legal scholars are unable to safely predict.
The most recent case concerning section 1983 and sovereign immunity
0
In Imbler the Court held that a state prosecuting
is Imbler v. Pachtman."'
attorney, "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case," was
absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983.02
The Court favored an absolute immunity, rather than a qualified immunity,
for the prosecutor so as not to limit the prosecutor's conduct at trial or
otherwise "undermine [the] performance of his duties."'0 3 If the door for
potential liability was left open, any defendant could harass the government's
attorney by filing a lawsuit, exposing the prosecutor to a damage award
and to the cost and time of defending against the claim. Furthermore,
100 420 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975), wherein the Court, citing Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. at 322 stated "[A]n official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments."
For a good example of the problems courts will face in applying the second element of
the Wood test (i.e., clearly established constitutional rights) in situations where such violations
are not so blatant, see Wolfel v. Sanborn, Nos. 76-1030-31 (6th Cir. May 2, 1977). Compare
Wolfel, supra, with Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 930 (1975).
101 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court has resisted two recent attempts to expand the scope of
section 1983. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) the Court held that the district court's
order requiring the City of Philadelphia to improve its procedures for acting on citizen
complaints about police abuses was an effort to do too much on the basis of too little. Besides
problems with federalism and whether there existed a case or controversy, the Court remarked
that the federal courts can only act on the basis of a constitutional violation. Herein, "the
district court found that the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights." Id. at 377.
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court declined to expand section 1983 into a
federal torts claim act. A flyer from the Louisville and Jefferson County Police Departments
falsely identified Davis by photo and name as an active shoplifter. Davis sued area police
chiefs under section 1983 claiming that his fourteenth amendment due process right to
liberty had been infringed. The Court rejected the suit on two grounds: first, Davis had
failed to specify an invasion of a specific constitutional guarantee; and second, mere
allegation of stigma or loss of reputation without an attendant alteration of a legal right
or status is insufficient to establish a liberty or property interest under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.
102

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
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courts might be reluctant to grant post-conviction relief to the defendant
for fear that the prosecutor may be later called to task for any error in
0
judgment.'
Necessarily, a grant of absolute immunity to all state officials would
negate the remedy afforded by section 1983.15 Thus, the Imbler Court remarked that "[Section] 1983 immunities were not products of judicial fiat
that officials in different branches of government are differently amenable to
suit under § 1983. Rather, each was predicated upon a considered inquiry
into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law
06
and the interests behind it."
When the Imbler Court examined the rationale of the common law
rule and applied it to Section 1983, the adverse consequences flowing from a
qualified protection required that an absolute immunity be afforded prosecutors. Yet the persuasiveness of this approach was sharply challenged by
Justice White in his concurrence in the judgment in Imbler.
However, these adverse consequences are present with respect to suits
against policemen, school teachers, and other executives, and have
never before been thought sufficient to immunize an official absolutely
no matter how outrageous his conduct. Indeed, these reasons are present
with respect to suits against all state officials and must necessarily have
been rejected by Congress as a basis for absolute immunity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, for its enactment is a clear indication that at least some
officials should be accountable in damages for their official acts. Thus,
unless the threat of suit is also thought to injure the governmental
decisionmaking process, the other unfortunate consequences flowing
from damage suits against state officials are sufficient only to extend
a qualified immunity to the official in question. Accordingly, the question whether a prosecutor enjoys an absolute immunity from damage
suits under § 1983, or only a qualified immunity, depends upon whether
the common law and reason support the proposition that extending
absolute immunity is necessary to protect the judicialprocess.'
An equally compelling conclusion, however, is that state executive
officials and school board members, like prosecutors, should have absolute
immunity. Of course such a step would require a legislative solution. The
104

Id. at 424-28. The Imbler decision was recently followed in Hilliard v. Williams, 540

F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976), granting immunity from damages to the state prosecutor, despite

his actions depriving the defendant of a fair trial. Similarly, Flood v. Harrington, 532 F.2d
1248, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1976) and Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976) both
extended absolute immunity to federal prosecutors in reliance on Imbler.
105 424 U.S. at 433-34 (White, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 421.
1071d. at 436-37

(White, J., concurring in judgment)

(emphasis in original)

omitted). Justices Brennan and Marshall, joined in Justice White's concurrence.
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doctrine of executive absolute immunity would be grounded on the fear
that potential liability might deter an officer from executing his duties
vigorously and decisively. In Barr v. Matteo,1 18 Justice Harlan stated:
The reasons for the recognition of the privilege have been often stated.
It has been thought important that officials of government should be
free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits
in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would
consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the
fearless,9 vigorous, and effective administration of policies of govern10
ment.
In answer to the contention that an absolute immunity for state officials would emasculate the purpose behind section 1983 actions, it should
be said that, as noted in Imbler, the policy considerations which compel
civil immunity for certain governmental officials do not also place them
beyond the reach of the criminal law.110 In fact, the members of the Ohio
National Guard in the Kent State case were subjected to a criminal trial
in the district court which resulted in a judgment of acquittal. 1 '
The answers which the Supreme Court has given to the sovereign
immunity problems beckon a new standard of review. The Court in Scheuer v.
Rhodes cited the Tenney and Pierson cases which granted absolute immunity
to legislators and judges respectively, and then went on to note that "[I]n
the case of higher officers of the executive branch, however, the inquiry is
far more complex .... "'12 It is ironic, however, that the Scheuer Court then
concluded that only a qualified immunity is available to executive officers.
One would think that where the day-to-day decision-making process of state
executive officials is "more complex" or at least as equally complex as that
of legislators and judges, absolute immunity would likewise be appropriate.
If the temerity and courageousness required of the officeholder are proportionate to the amount of immunity protection, then all the more reason
that all state officials should have immunity. On the one hand, the impeachment process and the ballot box are at least minimal controls on official
behavior; on the other hand, Congress should reexamine the scope of section
1983 to determine the degree of immunity for state officials. The public
should not be required to wade through the malaise of judicial opinions to
learn to what extent their local school board members are amenable to
108 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
109

Id. at 571.

110 424 U.S. at 429.

"'1United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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civil damages or that their local prosecutor cannot be challenged in a
civil suit, despite his deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence, misconduct or negligence.
This article has examined recent federal court decisions on the erosion
of sovereign immunity. Although the Supreme Court's decisions on the
eleventh amendment in recent years have made it more difficult for a citizen
to sue the state, litigants have been focusing on the state officials. Regardless,
the raid on the state treasury still exists. Rather than placing sole reliance on
section 1983 to check state executive officials misconduct, other alternatives
that may afford some relief to the harried state taxpayers should be
explored. "'

113

If a claim is against the State of Ohio, a remedy is provided in the Ohio Court of Claims.

OHIO REv. CODE ANN, § 2743.01 - 2743.20 (Page Supp. 1976).
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